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I. INTRODUCTION
Under the economic substance doctrine as codified in section
7701(o), legislatively unintended tax benefits may be disallowed if a
transaction lacks a substantial business purpose or fails to accomplish
a meaningful change in the taxpayer's economic position.' In a recent
. Warren Distinguished Professor, University of San Diego School of Law. This
paper stems from my participation in a panel commenting on The Frame Game: How
Defining the "Transaction" Decides the Case by David Hariton, reprinted as the
preceding article in this issue, at the Virginia Tax Study Group Conference held in
Charlottesville on March 25, 2011. 1 would like to thank my co-panelists, William
Alexander and David Hariton.
Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1409, 124 Stat. 1029 (Mar. 30, 2010). Although no
"official" legislative history is available, there are several sources of guidance. See
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, Technical Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the
"Reconciliation Act of 2010," as Amended, in Combination with the "Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act" (JCX-18-10) (Mar. 21, 2010) [hereinafter
Technical Explanation]; H.R. Rep. No. 111-443, pt. 1, 111th Cong., 2d Sess. (2010);
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article on framing the "transaction" in economic substance cases,
2
David Hariton makes three interrelated points. First, he observes that
even though the judicial outcome may depend largely on how the
relevant transaction is framed, few courts have explicitly focused on
the framing issue. Second, he proposes that courts should
presumptively frame the underlying transaction broadly by focusing
on the entirety of the taxpayer's undertaking, rather than
disaggregating particular tax-motivated steps or structures. Finally, he
believes that the principal target of the economic substance doctrine
should be "tax shelters" whose defining hallmark is that they are
''extraneous to the taxpayer's business rather than merely an aspect of
it."3
Although Hariton was an early supporter of the economic
substance doctrine,' he has consistently opposed applying the doctrine
outside the tax shelter context. For this purpose, a tax shelter may be
loosely defined as a transaction intended to generate losses that offset
income from another unrelated transaction or activity.' Framing the
relevant transaction narrowly for purposes of testing economic
substance would generally allow the broadest possible scope for
section 7701(o). Hariton is concerned, however, that a
"disaggregation" approach would impermissibly impinge on
legitimate tax planning in which tax-motivated steps are integrated
with a larger transaction. To cabin application of section 7701(o),
Hariton proposes that the Treasury issue regulations that would
effectively add a third prong to the economic substance test: section
7701(o) would generally disallow only tax benefits (e.g., deductions,
losses, and basis increases) that shelter items of income or gain
see also I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-2 C.B. 411 (providing interim guidance); I.R.S.
Treas. Dir. LB&I-04-0711-015 (July 18, 2011) (directive to IRS examiners and
managers).
2 See David P. Hariton, The Frame Game: How Defining the "Transaction"
Decides the Case, 63 TAx LAW. 1 (2009).
Id. at 38.
Id. See, e.g., David P. Hariton, Sorting out the Tangle of Economic Substance,
52 TAX LAW. 235 (1999) [hereinafter Hariton, Sorting]; David P. Hariton, Kafka and
the Tax Shelter, 57 TAX L. REV. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Hariton, Kafka].
5 See, e.g., David P. Hariton, How to Fix Economic Substance, 99 TAX NOTES
539 (2003).
6 Hariton would define a "tax shelter" as "a financial transaction that produces
a tax deduction or loss in the absence of any economic loss." David P. Hariton, When
and How Should the Economic Substance Doctrine Be Applied, 60 TAx L. REV. 29, 31
(2006); id. ("This noneconomic tax loss then serves to offset unrelated income and
thus 'shelter' the tax that would otherwise have been imposed on the taxpayer.").
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extrinsic to the taxpayer's business.!
It is useful to consider how Hariton's framing guidelines would
affect the outcome of several recent economic substance cases. In
enacting section 7701(o), Congress chose to clarify and enhance the
common-law economic substance doctrine - itself an amalgam of
other judicial doctrines' - rather than address tax shelters
specifically.! Congress left further development of the doctrine to the
courts, while expressly approving of the courts's ability to aggregate,
disaggregate, or otherwise recharacterize transactions.'o The Treasury
and courts should be wary of mechanical approaches to framing that
would restrict the range of potential transactions to which the
economic substance doctrine may be considered relevant.
Notwithstanding the risk of increased planning uncertainty, courts
need a measure of flexibility in framing economic substance cases to
accomplish the intended purpose of section 7701(o).
II. HIDDEN EFFECT OF FRAMING: COLTEC AND SHELL PETROLEUM
To appreciate the significance of framing, it is useful to consider
two recent cases in the corporate context involving acceleration and
potential duplication of losses: Coltec" and Shell Petroleum.12 While
the taxpayer lost in Coltec and won in Shell Petroleum, it seems likely
that § 7701(o) would strengthen the government's litigating position
under circumstances similar to Shell Petroleum. As these cases
illustrate, courts must often choose between alternative "frames" of a
particular transaction. The government may seek to define the

See Letter from David P. Hariton to Michael F. Mundaca, Assistant Sec'y,
Tax Policy (Proposed Regulations Under Section 7701(o) Clarifying the Economic
Substance Doctrine, July 27, 2010), 2010 TNT 145-21.
On the role of the economic substance doctrine as a method of statutory
interpretation, see generally Joseph Bankman, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 74
S. CAL. L. REV. 5 (2000); JASPER L. CUMMINGS, JR., THE SUPREME COURT'SFEDERAL
TAX JURISPRUDENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF FACT FINDING METHODS AND STATUTORY

1801 - PRESENT (2010).
See, e.g., Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the
Search for a Silver Bullet, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1939, 1952 (2005) (proposing to
disallow noneconomic losses and to add back income that is uneconomically shifted
from the taxpayer to a tax-exempt party).
to See infra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
11 Coltec Indus., Inc., v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert.
denied, 549 U.S. 1206 (2007).
12 Shell Petroleum Inc. v. United States, 2008-2 U.S.T.C. T150,422 (S.D. Tex.
INTERPRETATION FROM THE COURT'S TAX OPINIONS,
9

2008).
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transaction narrowly so as to isolate tax-motivated steps from a
purported larger business transaction, while the taxpayer argues that
the transaction should be defined broadly." Given the fact-intensive
nature of economic substance cases and differing judicial
temperaments, it is often impossible to predict how another court
14
would handle a nearly identical or closely similar case.
The facts of Coltec, somewhat simplified, were as follows. Coltec
transferred its own note and contingent asbestos liabilities to a
subsidiary in exchange for stock in a tax-free section 351 transaction.
Coltec treated the basis of the stock as equal to the amount of its note
transferred to the subsidiary, unreduced by the offsetting contingent
liabilities assumed by the subsidiary. Coltec then sold the high-basis,
low-value stock to a third party, claiming a $380 million loss on the
sale." On appeal, the Federal Circuit observed that "the transaction to
be analyzed is the one that gave rise to the alleged tax benefit."" It
found that the transactional steps used to create the high-basis, lowvalue stock (the transfer to the subsidiary of a note in exchange for
assumption of liabilities) were "separate and distinct" from the
taxpayer's claimed business purpose of having the subsidiary manage
and administer the asbestos liabilities." So viewed, the relevant
transaction lacked any meaningful purpose apart from saving taxes."'
Applying familiar step-transaction principles, the government may also seek
to aggregate purportedly separate steps of an overall transaction.
14 See, e.g., CUMMINGS, supra note 8, at 146 (emphasizing
the role of fact-finding
in economic substance cases).
1 To put an end to Coltec-type transactions, Congress enacted section 358(h).
See I.R.C. § 358(h) (requiring a basis step-down to reflect contingent liabilities).
16 Coltec, 454 F.3d at 1356; id. at 1353 (noting that "the economic substance
doctrine represents a judicial effort to enforce the statutory purpose of the tax code");
see also Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund v. United States, 568 F.3d 537, 545 (5th Cir.
2009) (noting that "when applying the economic substance doctrine, the proper focus
is on the particular transaction that gives rise to the tax benefit, not collateral
transactions that do not produce tax benefits"); Black & Decker Corp. v. United
States, 436 F.3d 431, 441 (4th Cir. 2006) (focusing on the "specific transaction whose
tax consequences are in dispute").
17 Coltec, 454 F.3d at 1358; id. ("The first asserted business purpose focuses on
the wrong transaction...."). The court found that the taxpayer "has not
demonstrated any business purpose to be served by linking [the subsidiary's]
assumption of the liabilities to the centralization of litigation management." Id.
Id. at 1347. The court also rejected the taxpayer's claim that creation of the
subsidiary added a barrier to a third party's ability to pierce the corporate veil
because there was "no objective basis" for the taxpayer's assertion that the
subsidiary's assumption of liabilities "would in any way ameliorate this veil-piercing
problem." Id. at 1359.
13
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Hariton argues that Coltec misframed the relevant transaction.
Rather than viewing the transaction as a whole, the court wrongly
"focused on a preliminary transaction step that served to create" the
high-basis, low-value stock.19 Hariton's argument is not that Coltec
was wrongly decided, but rather that narrow framing leaves taxpayers
without any meaningful guidance concerning when the economic
substance doctrine applies.20 When the transaction to be tested is
defined narrowly as merely the tax-motivated steps, the taxpayer is
almost certain to lose. Viewed in isolation, the tax-motivated steps
lack any business purpose and have no significant effect on the
taxpayer's overall economic position. As a last resort, the taxpayer
must argue that the tax-motivated steps should nevertheless be
21
respected because they are in accordance with congressional intent.
This claim is unlikely to succeed, however, when the relevant
transaction is structured to exploit an unintended statutory or
regulatory gap while purportedly complying with the literal language
22
of the Code. Had Congress or the Treasury considered the matter
explicitly, the taxpayer's aggressive position most likely would not
have been sanctioned. Thus, the court's framing of the transaction
may often determine the outcome.
Coltec's narrow framing arguably reflects a "fundamental
misunderstanding" 23 of the Supreme Court's seminal decision in
Gregory.24 By contrast, other courts have "applied the reasoning" of
Gregory to disallow tax benefits only when a transaction lacked
"business purpose and economic substance considered as a whole." 25
Hariton would therefore define the term "transaction," for purposes
of section 7701(o), as including "the entirety of what might reasonably
be proposed to a taxpayer as a coherent undertaking." 26 The relevant
transaction would not be framed so broadly as to encompass the
Hariton, supra note 6, at 29-30.
Id. at 30-31.
21 See Technical Explanation, supra note 1, at
152 n.344 ("If the realization of
the tax benefits of a transaction is consistent with the Congressional purpose or plan
that the tax benefits were designed by Congress to effectuate, it is not intended that
such tax benefits be disallowed.").
22 See Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 9, at 1939-40 ("It is beyond doubt that
such manipulations are contrary to congressional intent . . . .").
23 Hariton, supra note 6, at 41; id. at 41 n.45 (noting Coltec's reliance on Gregory
to support narrow framing).
24 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
25 See Hariton, supra note 6, at 43-44; id. at 44 (claiming that "there is ... no
doctrine that disallows the tax benefits arising from mere transaction steps").
26 Hariton, supra note 7, at 3 (defining "transaction").
1
20
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taxpayer's entire business (or line of business), nor so narrowly as to
encompass "mere tax-motivated structures or steps that are part of
the relevant undertaking." 27 If Coltec arose under section 7701(o),
Hariton would frame the relevant transaction as the "entire series of
transactions by which the taxpayer seeks to accelerate, and possibly
duplicate, an asbestos-related loss by selling preferred stock to an

unrelated party." 28
In enacting section 7701(o), Congress clarified that the economic
substance doctrine applies to a single transaction or series of
transactions.29 The statutory provision is intended to eliminate any
uncertainty concerning courts' ability to "aggregate, disaggregate, or
otherwise recharacterize" transactions.3 3 Indeed, the legislative history
refers favorably to Coltec, noting that a court has the ability "to
bifurcate a transaction in which independent activities with non-tax
objectives are combined with an unrelated item having only taxavoidance objectives in order to disallow those tax-motivated
benefits.",3 Prior codification proposals included a requirement that
the transaction under scrutiny be a "reasonable means" of
accomplishing the taxpayer's nontax purpose,32 reinforcing the courts'
ability to separate transactions that are ostensibly linked. Although
section 7701(o) does not expressly include the reasonable means
requirement, such a standard is implicitly taken into account in
determining whether steps in an overall transaction should be
aggregated or disaggregated. 33 Individual steps of a multi-step
Id. Certain structures and steps would be carved out if "they bear a strained
and tangential relation to the relevant business transaction." Id.
28 Id. (Ex. 5) ("The first step [formation of the special
purpose subsidiary] is not
a transaction in its own right for this purpose.").
29 See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(D)
("The term 'transaction' includes a series of
transactions.").
3o Technical Explanation,supra note 1, at 153.
3
Id. Several courts have approved the bifurcation approach. See, e.g., ACM
P'ship v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998); Long Term Capital Holdings LP
v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D. Conn. 2004), affd, 2005-2 U.S.T.C. 50,575
(2d Cir. 2005).
32 See, e.g., H.R. 2625, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005) (Abusive Tax Shelter
Shutdown and Taxpayer Accountability Act of 2005).
33 Technical Explanation,supra note 1, at 154 n.354 ("Key to [the determination
of whether a transaction has economic substance] is that the transaction must be
rationally related to a useful nontax purpose that is plausible in light of the taxpayer's
conduct and useful in light of the taxpayer's economic situation and intentions. Both
the utility of the stated purpose and the rationality of the means chosen to effectuate
it must be evaluated in accordance with commercial practices in the relevant
27
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transaction may be disaggregated unless the taxpayer demonstrates
that such steps are reasonably related to the nontax purpose of the
overall transaction (and the overall transaction is consistent with
Congressional intent).14 A reasonable means or "comparative
relatedness" test inevitably requires an exercise of judgment
concerning the proximity of the tax-motivated means and asserted
business objective. 35
In Shell Petroleum, the district court rejected "slicing and dicing"
36
a transaction involving facts similar to Coltec. The facts of Shell
Petroleum, somewhat simplified, were as follows. Separate Shell
subsidiaries transferred income-producing assets and nonproducing
oil properties with a low value and high basis to a newly-formed
subsidiary (Frontier) in exchange for common stock and preferred
stock. Simultaneously, Frontier raised $164 million in cash by
transferring preferred stock to independent investors. As in Coltec,
the internal restructuring allowed Shell to claim two potential tax
losses as a result of a single economic loss." While the government
industry.") (quoting ACM P'ship v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189 (1997),
affid on this issue, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998)).
34 See N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N, TAX SEC'N, REPORT ON CODIFICATION OF THE
ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE 81 (2011); Monte A. Jackel, Dawn of a New Era:
Congress Codifies Economic Substance, 127 TAX NOTES 289, 298 (Apr. 19, 2010)
(noting that the "'germaneness' of the means chosen by the taxpayer to effectuate the
transaction [is now a factor] in evaluating" the substantiality of the taxpayer's
asserted nontax purpose).
35 Walter J. Blum, Motive, Intent, and Purpose in FederalIncome Taxation, 34 U.
CHI. L. REv. 485, 524 (1967) ("What emerges is that an anti-tax avoidance principle
tends in practice to resemble a comparative relatedness test. Often the critical
question, in effect, ultimately becomes: How close is the relationship that can be seen
between action of the kind taken and the asserted non-tax objectives?").
36 Shell Petroleum Inc. v. United States, 2008-2 U.S.T.C. T 50,422, at
85,080
(S.D. Tex. 2008); see Hariton, supra note 7, at 4 (Ex. 6) (claiming the relevant
transaction is "the entire series of transactions by which the taxpayer seeks to obtain
both equity capital and a current tax loss ... [and the] fact that the taxpayer may have
chosen a less efficient means of obtaining equity capital in order to accommodate its
tax objectives is irrelevant").
Because the high-vote auction rate preferred stock received by the
independent investors represented more than twenty percent of the total voting
power of Frontier, Frontier was no longer includible in Shell's consolidated group. See
Shell Petroleum, 2008-2 U.S.T.C. 1 50,422, $ 85,065; I.R.C. § 1504(a). On the planned
sale of the high-basis, low-value preferred stock received in exchange for the
nonproducing properties, another Shell subsidiary (Western) was thus allowed to
realize a loss. Subsequently, Frontier redeemed the independent investors' preferred
stock and rejoined Shell's consolidated group, potentially allowing Shell to duplicate
the loss on the stock sale when it eventually disposed of the nonproducing properties.
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relied on Coltec's framing approach, the District Court found no Fifth
Circuit precedent sanctioning the disaggregation approach.3 " It was
impressed by "the non-illusory nature of Shell's real losses" and found
that Coltec was readily distinguishable because Shell's purported
business objectives - raising cash and asset management and
preservation - were not tainted by "objective impossibility."3 1
Although Shell could have employed alternative means to achieve its
business objectives, the means chosen were legitimate even though
they yielded significant tax benefits.
Confronted with facts similar to Shell Petroleum, another court
might well have reached a different result, even without the benefit of
section 7701(o). Under the district court's analysis, any section 351
transaction that raises outside cash would apparently satisfy the
business purpose prong. Nevertheless, the transfers in Shell
Petroleum arguably "did not accomplish anything economically,"4 1
notwithstanding the presence of independent investors who essentially
sought an interest-like return on their preferred investment. The
district court conspicuously failed to consider whether the transfer by
the independent investors was functionally related to the Shell
subsidiaries' contribution of built-in loss property in a manner
sufficient to warrant allowing the claimed tax benefits.4 In assessing
Shell's nontax business purpose, lack of such a functional relationship
might justify treating the transfers as separate for purposes of section

7701 (o). 4 3
Shell Petroleum, 2008-2 U.S.T.C. $ 50,422, 1 85,080 (citing Hariton's critique
of Coltec).
39 Id. $$ 85,080-81; see also id. $ 85,079 (noting that "a taxpayer's restructuring
of a going concern is a recognized, valid business purpose").
40 See id. 1 85,082.
41 New Economic Substance Law Seen Helping IRS in Cases Similar to 'Shell,'
Daily Tax Report at K-5 (April 26, 2010) (quoting William Alexander, I.R.S. Assoc.
50,422,
Chief Counsel (Corporate)); see also Shell Petroleum, 2008-2 U.S.T.C.
11 85,079-80 (noting that the independent investors could not rely on the
nonproducing properties to service dividend payments, obliging Shell to contribute
other income-producing properties).
4 See Robert Willens, Shell Oil's Double-Dipping Strategy Pays Off, 120 TAX
NOTES 687, 688 n.2 (Aug. 18, 2008) (noting that independent investors might not be
viewed as bona fide members of the control group under section 351). Alternatively,
the government could argue that the contribution of the nonproducing properties was
a separate transaction that was required to satisfy section 7701(o) independently.
43 See Martin J. McMahon, Beyond a GAAR: Retrofitting the Code to Rein in
21st Century Tax Shelters, 98 TAX NOTES 1721, 1728 (Mar. 17, 2003) (noting that
courts have applied a "functionally unrelated" test to disaggregate transactions in the
reorganization area).
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Even if framed broadly, the Shell Petroleum transaction might
well lack economic substance based on a comparison of the relative
magnitude of the potential tax and nontax benefits from the
transaction." The nontax benefits from Shell's asserted business goals
of raising outside cash and providing better "fit and focus" for its
nonproducing properties "appear to pale in comparison to the more
than $100 million of immediate tax savings" generated by the
restructuring. 45 Any sensible application of the economic substance
46
doctrine should require comparison of the tax and nontax benefits.
In a Shell Petroleum-type case, the comparative approach would likely
result in a decision in favor of the government even if a court proved
unwilling to disaggregate purely tax-motivated steps.4 7 In enacting
section 7701(o), Congress dispelled any lingering doubt that courts
should be free to apply the economic substance doctrine either to an
entire transaction viewed broadly or, under the disaggregation
approach, to separate tax-motivated steps. Nevertheless, Congress did
not require a court confronted with a similar transaction to adopt the
framing approach employed by either Coltec or Shell Petroleum.
Following enactment of section 362(e), a taxpayer can generally
no longer obtain a double loss - once on sale of the stock and
subsequently on sale of the contributed assets - as a result of a
48
section 351 contribution of high-basis, low-value property. By
analogy to Cottage Savings,4 it might be argued that a taxpayer in
Shell's situation should thus be permitted to determine the timing of
recognition of a single economic loss inherent in the stock. Yet, Shell
Petroleum is clearly distinguishable from Cottage Savings. Rather than
merely involving a timing benefit, the overall transaction in Shell
Petroleum allowed the taxpayer to realize a loss from the sale of the
44 See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(A) (Nontax benefits must be "substantial in relation
to the ... tax benefits."); see also Hariton,supra note 7, at 6 (Ex. 12) (concluding that
the court has discretion to determine that obtaining $164 million equity capital is not
"meaningful and substantial" in relation to acceleration of loss).
4 See Bret Wells, Economic Substance Doctrine: How Codification Changes
Decided Cases, 10 FLA. TAX REV. 441, 448 (2010).
See Bankman, supra note 8, at 26.
4 Similarly, if the Coltec transaction were framed broadly, the comparative
benefit test should reach the same result. See Hariton, supra note 7, at 7 (Ex. 14)
(disallowing loss in Coltec under broad framing).
48 See I.R.C. § 362(e)(2) (requiring a step-down in the transferee's basis in the
contributed assets (or the transferor's basis in the stock) to avoid duplication of builtin loss).
49 Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554 (1991) (loss realized under
section 1001 on swap of economically identical loan portfolios).
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high-basis, low-value stock while retaining the economic upside in the
nonproducing properties that generated the loss. Hariton suggests that
loss duplication represents an "arguably much more egregious"
violation than mere manipulation of timing benefits.o Many taxmotivated transactions revolve around timing mismatches, however,
rather than creation of artificial losses. In Coltec, the court was clearly
aware that the transaction had the potential both to accelerate and
potentially to duplicate losses (once on sale of the stock and again on
payment of the liability)." Even if section 362(e)(2) precludes a
double benefit in a Shell Petroleum-type transaction, the government
should nevertheless be free to argue that transaction steps intended to
accelerate loss may be disaggregated for purposes of section 7701(0).52
III. SALE OF A BUSINESS: STOIE CREEK AND COUNTRYSIDE
In the context of a sale of a business, the disposition itself
normally satisfies the requirement that the relevant transaction has a
substantial business purpose and results in a meaningful economic
change in the taxpayer's position. If additional steps are inserted,
however, the issue is whether such steps should be treated as a
separate transaction in their own right or merely as a tax-motivated
means of accomplishing a legitimate business transaction. Two recent
cases illustrate the problem of framing in the context of taxengineering ostensibly related to the sale of a business: Stobie Creek5 3
and Countryside.54 Hariton suggests that the court's broad framing of
the transaction in one case (Countryside) meant that the transaction
had both a business purpose and economic substance, while the
court's narrow framing in the other case (Stobie Creek) effectively
precluded such a finding.
In Stobie Creek, the taxpayers sought to eliminate gain on a
planned sale of stock in their family business by contributing low5o Hariton, supra note 6, at 31. See Hariton,supra note 7, at 2 (Ex. 2) (economic
substance doctrine relevant if loss acceleration is outside the "reasonable ambit" of
what Congress intended); id. at 2-3 (Ex. 3) (economic substance always relevant in
transactions generating noneconomic loss).
5 Cf. Hariton,supra note 6, at 31 (faulting Coltec court for failing to specify the
ground on which the claimed loss was objectionable).
52 See N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N, supra note 34, at 80-81 (discussing Shell
Petroleum).
Stobie Creek Invs., LLC v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 636 (2008), affd, 608
F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
54 Countryside Ltd. P'ship v. Commissioner, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1006 (2008).
5 Hariton, supra note 2, at 4-9.
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basis, high-value stock to a partnership and using offsetting foreign
currency options to enhance outside basis artificially. By ignoring the
offsetting contingent obligation for purposes of the partnership basis
rules, the taxpayers claimed that this "Son-of-BOSS" transaction
eliminated $202 million of gain (equal to the inflated outside basis
subsequently transferred to the stock) on the sale of the family
business.56 The court found that the offsetting option transaction
lacked both a business purpose and economic substance. While the
taxpayers theoretically had a possibility of hitting a $400 million
jackpot in the unlikely event that the foreign currency spot price fell
within a narrowly defined range at the end of a specified period, the
sweet spot turned out to be an illusion." Because the fees paid to the
option counterparty and the shelter promoters dwarfed any potential
profit, the court had no difficulty in concluding that the transaction
"lacked objective economic reality.""
The Stobie Creek transaction was structured to enhance basis
rather than generate an artificial loss. In Hariton's view, this basisboost structure allowed the taxpayers to argue that the "option
transactions were merely a way of structuring their sale of stock - a
tax-efficient way, to be sure - but nevertheless a way of structuring
what clearly was a legitimate business transaction."" For purposes of
the economic substance analysis, the relevant question ought thus to
be whether the option transactions were properly viewed as a separate
and distinct undertaking or as part of an integrated transaction
resulting in disposition of the stock. If the option transactions were
treated as separate from the stock sale, the taxpayers should have
easily lost, since the "'transaction' was, in that case, nothing but a tax
shelter."a While the court implicitly assumed that the option
transactions should be viewed separately, it did not even enunciate
56 For a discussion of the offsetting-option shelter, see generally Karen C. Burke
& Grayson M.P. McCouch, COBRA Strikes Back: Anatomy of a Tax Shelter, 62 TAX
LAW. 59 (2008).
5 Since the option counterparty (Deutsche Bank) could prevent the sweet spot
from being hit, the taxpayers could not realistically hope to make a lucky strike. See
Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Stobie Creek: Too Good to Be True?, 120
TAX NOTES 705, 705 (2008) ("No matter how large the jackpot, a lottery ticket is
worthless if the lottery is rigged."). In connection with its participation in tax shelters,
Deutsche Bank entered into a nonprosecution agreement and paid substantial
penalties. See Amy S. Elliott, Deutsche Bank Admits Tax Shelter Wrongdoing, Will
Pay $550 Million to U.S., 2010 TNT 245-1.
Stobie Creek, 82 Fed. Cl. at 697.
59 Hariton, supra note 2, at 4.
6 Id. at 4-5.
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this "conclusion upon which its entire decision rested." 61 Hariton
speculates that the taxpayers might have won if the option investment
were considered part of the stock sale, since the "court agreed with
the [taxpayers'] technical analysis and the sale of stock obviously had
business purpose." 62
Hariton's criticism notwithstanding, the lower court in Stobie
Creek should not be faulted for failing to inquire whether the planned
stock sale somehow imbued the sham option transaction with a
business purpose. Indeed, the only link between the option investment
and stock sale was that the Welles family turned to the shelter
promoter (Paul Daugerdas of Jenkens & Gilchrist) because they
desired to eliminate the large anticipated gain on their stock. Except
that it boosted basis, the Stobie Creek transaction was
indistinguishable from loss-generating transactions that the
government challenged in Notice 2000-44.63 Although the sale of the
family business was "a real transaction with economic substance," the
option investment was "not a way of structuring [that] deal;" rather, it
was "simply a means to the desired end of creating a tax benefit."6
Had Jeffrey Welles, who controlled the managing partner, asserted
that he "viewed our purchase and sale of options as a necessary step in
selling [the family] stock" in the most tax-efficient way, 65any
experienced judge would presumably have rejected this self-serving
assertion.
Hariton would define the relevant transaction presumptively as
consisting of an entire series of transactions viewed as a whole. He
would nevertheless allow tax-motivated structures or steps to be
carved out if, as in ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, they bear a
"strained and tangential relation to the relevant business
transaction."6 ACM involved a contingent installment note sale
(CINS) transaction which generated a large capital loss (and a large
offsetting gain allocated to a foreign partner). The taxpayer argued
that its initial investment in AAA notes (which were later exchanged
for the contingent installment obligations and cash) served a
Id. at 4 (noting that "[tihe court simply took it for granted that the relevant
transaction was the investment in options").
62
Id
63 2000-2 C.B. 255, 2000
WL 1138430.
61

Stobie Creek Invs. LLC v. United States, 608 F.3d 1366,1379 (2010).
Hariton, supra note 2, at 5. As a highly educated professional with substantial
investment banking experience, Welles should have known that the tax shelter was
"too good to be true." Stobie Creek, 608 F.3d at 1382-83.
6
Hariton, supra note 7, at 3.
(
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legitimate nontax purpose - namely, to repurchase its debt through a
partnership. The court in ACM rejected this argument, concluding
that the investment in AAA notes, viewed separately, "did not
constitute an economically substantive transaction."67 Because this
separate investment generated only a relatively small net return in
relationship to the large capital loss claimed, Hariton would treat this
carved-out transaction as lacking both a business purpose and
economic substance.6
ACM illustrates the "slippery slope" if taxpayers are permitted to
satisfy the economic substance test by tying tax-motivated steps or
61
structures to the ordinary course of their business. One can readily
imagine scenarios in which the CINS investment is more closely
linked to the taxpayer's ordinary business.70 If certain tangential or
contrived steps may be carved out for separate treatment, however,
Hariton's premise that the economic substance test should be applied
presumptively to an entire series of transactions viewed as a whole
may itself lack much substance. A complex, tax-advantaged way of
accomplishing a business purpose would be respected only if the taxmotivated steps producing the claimed tax benefit were "not essential
to completion of the transaction or if the tax benefit did not bear the
proper relationship to the transaction."71 Setting aside administrative
considerations, there is no principled justification for curtailing the
application of the economic substance doctrine simply because taxengineered steps are tied more or less closely to a taxpayer's ordinary
business.
Broad framing of the relevant transaction implicitly assumes
taxpayers are entitled to plan a transaction in the most tax-

67

ACM P'ship v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231, 251 (3d Cir. 1998).

See Hariton, supra note 7, at 4-5 (concluding that the relevant transaction
"does not include the business-motivated repurchase of the taxpayer's outstanding
debt").
6 See Bankman, supra note 8, at 17 ("The favorable tax treatment for taxmotivated transactions tied to ordinary business operations .. . raises obvious line.").
drawing questions ...
70 See Hariton, supra note 4, at 269-70 (suggesting that the taxpayer in ACM
might have won if it had acquired and sold an office building for a contingent
installment obligation); cf David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55
TAx L. REV. 215, 238 (2002) ("But encouraging taxpayers to build empty buildings ...
that nobody wants to inhabit does not seem like the best policy.").
Mark P. Gergen, The Common Knowledge of Tax Abuse, 54 SMU L. REV.
131, 145 n.77 (2001) (suggesting that "[t]his leaves little substance to [Hariton's] initial
proposition").
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advantageous manner. Even if such tax planning is permissible,
however, one would expect courts to prove more willing to bifurcate
transactions when the intermediate steps are engineered to take
advantage of a loophole that can be readily replicated at virtually no
economic cost. Otherwise, such tax-engineered steps would lead to
large revenue losses and encourage other taxpayers to structure
transactions using the identical or similar steps. If "a rare transaction
is taxed incorrectly," the threat is that the "transaction will become
common as taxpayers take advantage of the problem." 73 Countryside
illustrates how mistaxation of an uncommon transaction - a novel
"add-on" to an otherwise real business transaction - would permit
conversion and indefinite deferral of gain whenever depreciated real
property is sold.74
Like Stobie Creek, the Countryside transaction used the
partnership basis rules to avoid gain on a sale of low-basis property
(real estate) and to duplicate basis in other property (AAA notes).
Consider a simplified version of the Countryside transaction involving
only two (rather than three) tiers of partnerships.7 ' Assume that the
ABCD partnership owns real estate with a basis of zero and a value of
$12 million; partners A and B own ninety-nine percent and partners C
and D own one percent of the partnership. ABCD borrows slightly
less than $12 million to purchase AAA notes and contributes the
notes to the new AB partnership; ABCD then distributes its entire
76
interest in AB to partners A and B in redemption of their interests.
The AB partnership claims to have a $12 million basis in the notes
equal to their purchase price, even though A and B have a zero basis
in their partnership interests. Finally, the continuing CD partnership
See Am. Bar Ass'n, Section of Taxation, Comments on Notice
2010-62 at 28,
2011 TNT 12-13 (Jan. 18, 2011) ("This principle is implicit in historical application of
the economic substance doctrine to a broader definition of the transaction to sanction
a taxpayer's choice of a favorable intermediate step.").
Weisbach, supra note 70, at 247. Indeed, one purpose of broad anti-abuse
rules is precisely to address such uncommon transactions.
The Countryside transaction converted gain from depreciation recapture on
the real estate (taxed at twenty-five percent) to deferred capital gain (taxed at fifteen
percent). See Karen C. Burke, Tax Avoidance As a Legitimate Business Purpose,118
TAX NOTES 1393,1394 (Mar. 31, 2008).
7 This simplified version is derived from Hariton, supra note 7, at 5-6.
7 A and B have a zero basis in their new partnership interest equal to the basis
of their former partnership interest. See I.R.C. § 732(b).
7 In the case of a tiered partnership, the upper-tier partnership is not permitted
to increase the basis of its assets when it distributes an interest in a lower-tier
partnership unless both partnerships have section 754 elections in effect. See I.R.C. §
72
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sells the real estate for $12 million and uses the proceeds to repay the
borrowing used to purchase the notes. Rather than realizing a $12
million gain on the sale, however, the CD partnership recognizes only
de minimis gain (one percent), since it claims that the basis of the real
estate is stepped up to reflect the gain left behind by A and B (ninetynine percent). Meanwhile, A and B may defer indefinitely and
potentially eliminate their share of the gain inherent in the real estate,
assuming the transaction survives scrutiny under various anti-abuse
rules.79
Again, the issue is how a court should frame the relevant
transaction for purposes of testing economic substance. In
Countryside,Hariton suggests that the taxpayers won because the Tax
Court defined the relevant transaction as "the broader one (i.e., the
sale of the real estate) and it conceived of the investment in the AAA
notes as a means of effecting the sale." Contrary to Hariton's
assertion, however, the court in fact defined the relevant transaction
narrowly as the ABCD partnership's redemption of A and B, isolated
from the subsequent sale of the real estate by the continuing CD
partnership. Indicating that the "transaction requiring economic
substance is Countryside's redemption" of the withdrawing partners'
interests, the court framed the question as "whether such a
redemption may be respected for tax purposes if the means
undertaken to accomplish it are chosen for their tax advantage."" It
761(e)(2) (treating distribution of a partnership interest as a deemed sale for purposes
of section 743); Rev. Rul. 87-115, 1987-2 C.B. 163; see also Rev. Rul. 92-15, 1992-1
C.B. 215. To avoid a basis step-down in the notes from $12 million to zero, the actual
Countryside transaction involved two lower-tier partnerships and inconsistent use of
section 754 elections.
7 In Hariton's example, both partnerships have section 754 elections in effect.
For transfers after June 23, 2003, the special basis allocation rules for "substituted
basis" exchanges would apply. See Treas. Reg. § 1.755-1 (b)(5)(ii). Since the redeemed
partners take a zero basis in the distributed lower-tier partnership interest, a $12
million downward adjustment should be required to the basis of the notes. Under the
revised regulations, however, no adjustment would be permitted because the property
held by the lower-tier partnership does not have a built-in loss. See William F. McKee
et al., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS %J 24.04[1][aj[ii]-[iii], at
24-20 to 24-23 (4th ed. 2007); id., $ 25.07[2], at 25-44.
79 The revised regulations warn that "abusive transactions" intended to exploit
the special basis allocation rules for substituted-basis exchanges may be challenged
under "a variety of judicial doctrines, including substance over form or step
transaction, or under Treasury Regulation 1.701-2." See T.D. 8847, 1999-2 C.B. 701,
704.
0 Hariton, supra note 2, at 7-8.
8 Countryside Ltd. P'ship v. Commissioner, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1006, 1019
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found that the redemption transaction served a genuine nontax
business purpose and had economic substance because it
accomplished a conversion of the taxpayers' partnership interests into
AAA notes, "two economically distinct forms of investment.",2
Without determining whether the continuing partnership's basis step83
up was valid, the court opined that the disaggregated transaction (an
investment in AAA notes and redemption) had both a business
purpose and economic substance.
Framed broadly, the relevant transaction in Countryside consisted
of the abusive tiered-partnership structure and each of its contrived
steps: the borrowing and purchase of AAA notes, the formation of
two lower-tier partnerships, the deferral of gain to the redeemed
partners, the step-up in the basis of the real estate, and the lack of a
basis step-down in the AAA notes." By contrast, the taxpayers asked
the court to ignore the steps that actually occurred and recast the
transaction "as if" the redeemed partners had received a simple
86
distribution of nonmarketable notes. The court's narrow holding was
that this fictional distribution of notes had economic substance, even
though analysis of the larger transaction might well require a different

(2008). For purposes of partial summary judgment, it was conceded that the
redemption was structured to defer tax to A and B by acquiring and distributing
nonmarketable notes (rather than marketable securities). Id. at 1014; cf I.R.C. §
731(c) (treating distribution of certain marketable securities as taxable).
82 Countryside, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1017-18 (2008) (concluding that change in
the redeemed partners' economic position satisfied the second prong of the economic
substance test).
With respect to the larger transaction, the court indicated that the government
had a choice of remedies including: (1) requiring a $12 million step-down in the basis
of the AAA notes, or (2) retroactively denying the $12 million basis step-up in
Countryside's real estate. Id. at 1022 n.29; see also id. at 1013 n.16 (noting potential
whipsaw issue). For the stipulated decision in the consolidated Countryside case, see
note 98 infra.
The court expressly stated that it was not ruling on the issue (involving a
different taxable year) of the partnership's basis step-up in the real estate. See id. at
1010 n.8; cf Hariton, supra note 7, at 5 (Ex. 9) (querying whether the whole
transaction resulting in a disposition of real estate with a stepped-up basis has
economic substance).
See Countryside, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1010 (noting government's argument
based on the "totality of the transactions ... and elections giving rise to the basis
results, as constituting 'an abusive tax avoidance result"').
86 Id. at 1017; cf Burke, supra note 74, at 1398 (noting that the court's
hypothetical recasting created a quandary, since it was impossible to determine the
basis of the notes (in the hands of the redeemed partners or the partnership) without
ruling on the abusive basis duplication steps).
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result. Having ruled favorably on the economic substance issue, the
court summarily concluded that the redemption satisfied the
partnership anti-abuse rule." Such a conclusion was possible only
because, under the court's truncated view of the relevant transaction,
it was possible to ignore the abusive basis duplication steps. Had it
framed the transaction broadly, the court might have reached a more
sensible result under the partnership anti-abuse regulation, without
having to invoke the economic substance doctrine.
Hariton asks whether the "distinction between [Countryside] and
Stobie Creek has enough analytic coherence to allow taxpayers to
know what to expect in the future."8 9 If one believes that Countryside
was wrongly decided, that query should be answered negatively.
As in Stobie Creek, the redemption transaction in Countryside
was linked to the sale of the real estate only because the taxpayers' tax
adviser suggested inserting additional steps to achieve the desired tax
goals.90 Indeed, Hariton acknowledges that, under a narrow framing,
the Countryside taxpayers might have lost, had the court rejected their
"dubious and self-serving" testimony that "they had invested in AAA
notes because they found them to be an irresistibly attractive
investment."" In this event, the court might have concluded that

"such an investment lacked business purpose and economic substance
and could not serve to defer tax on a sale of real estate."92
Since Countryside arose prior to the effective date of section
7701(o), it is not clear how a similar case would be decided under
current law. 93 Even absent section 7701(o), taxpayers should not be
permitted to gain a strategic litigation advantage by severing one
portion of a transaction from a larger overall transaction that, when
viewed as a whole, may lack economic substance.94 Although a
See Countryside, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1021-22; cf Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(c)
(requiring a "comparison of the purported business purpose for a transaction and the
claimed tax benefits resulting from the transaction"); Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(d),
(Ex. 8).
Indeed, both the Stobie Creek and Countryside transactions might have been
better addressed under the partnership anti-abuse rules.
89 Hariton, supra note 2, at 9.
9 See id. at 7 ("Is it not possible to describe the investment by the taxpayers in
AAA notes as extraneous to their sale of real estate?").
9 Id. at 9.
92 Id.
Under one view, the economic substance doctrine should not be relevant at all
in a case such as Countryside. See Monte A. Jackel, When Is the Economic Substance
Doctrine Relevant, 132 TAX NOTES 77, 79 (2011).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2 (partnership anti-abuse rule).
87
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business purpose for a partnership distribution may normally be
presumed, the nonrecognition rules should not be read so broadly as
to allow partners to identify property they would like to receive, and
arrange for the partnership to acquire the property and distribute it to
them.95 The redemption transaction served the redeemed partners'
desire to defer (and potentially eliminate) gain, but did not serve any
business purpose of the partnership.96 Viewed broadly, the
Countryside transaction should thus be vulnerable under section
7701(o) because it lacked a substantial business purpose and had little,
if any, economic significance apart from the tax savings.
Countryside may appear to embody a type of legitimate
transactional "tweaking" designed to structure the sale of a business
in the most tax-advantageous manner. Both the Countryside and
Stobie Creek transactions shared the common feature, however, of
exploiting rather obvious gaps in the partnership rules to defer or
eliminate gain with little or no economic risk. Recent legislation
aimed at curbing abusive manipulation of the partnership basis
adjustment rules would apparently leave the Countryside result
unaffected.9 Indeed, Countryside suggests a routine planning strategy
for partners in real estate partnerships who wish to indefinitely defer
and convert gain on depreciated real estate through a
pre-sale redemption.9
See Burke, supra note 74, at 14000)1; see also Monte A. Jackel, Subchapter K
and the Codified Economic Substance Doctrine, 128 TAX NOTEs 321, 324-25 (2010)
(discussing business purpose and partnership distributions).
9
In an arm's-length business transaction, it would have made no sense for the
nonredeemed partners to have assumed the risk of loss of the partnership's basis stepup (exposing them to nearly $12 million of additional gain) solely to save taxes for the
redeemed partners. Cf Countryside, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1017 ("All of the parties to
the transaction had legitimate business purposes .... ").
9 Congress in 2004 required mandatory section 754 adjustments in certain
situations. See I.R.C. §§ 734(a), 743(a). A mandatory section 743 adjustment is
triggered only if there is a "substantial built-in loss" following the distribution; since
the lower-tier partnership holding the AAA notes in Countryside claimed a basis
equal to their fair market value, there was no built-loss to trigger a downward basis
adjustment. See I.R.C. § 743(d); cf I.R.C. § 734(d) (triggering a mandatory
adjustment if there would otherwise be a "substantial basis reduction").
9
In the Countryside litigation consolidated in the Tax Court, the parties
eventually entered into a stipulated decision. Countryside Ltd. P'ship v.
Commissioner, No. 22023-05 (U.S.T.C. May 26, 2011); Countryside Ltd. P'ship v.
Commissioner, No. 3162-05 (U.S.T.C. May 26, 2011); CLP Promisee LLC v.
Commissioner, No. 2176-4)8 (U.S.T.C. May 26, 2011); Manchester Promisee LLC v.
Commissioner No. 217848 (U.S.T.C. May 26, 2011). Applying section 743(b) and
Treasury Regulation § 1.701-2 (2010), the court ordered a $12 million step-down in
95
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IV. UNINTENDED TAX BENEFITS: UPS AND CASTLE HARBOUR

When the economic substance doctrine is relevant, Hariton's
approach would disallow only "unintended tax benefits."" Tax
benefits would be defined restrictively as consisting of "deductions,
losses, increases in basis[,j and other items that might reasonably
serve to reduce, offset[,] or eliminate unrelated items of income or
gain."""' For Hariton, the key issue is whether the transaction viewed as a whole without bifurcating tax-motivated steps - gives
rise to a tax benefit that serves to eliminate tax on unrelated income:
"This is the 'framing question,' and it is the hardest question to
answer, but unless and until one answers it, the remaining questions
do not have any meaning."..o. This inquiry would, in effect, constitute a
third prong of the economic substance test: it would confine the scope
of the economic substance doctrine to tax-shelter transactions.
Hariton claims that, as currently formulated, the two-pronged
economic substance test is hopelessly amorphous: absent a definition
of a tax shelter, it is impossible to draw a meaningful distinction
between cases like ACM and UPS.1 02 In Hariton's view, "[tihe only
meaningful difference between UPS and [ACM] is that the latter, but
not the former, gave rise to a large tax benefit that was used to offset
the tax that otherwise would have been paid on unrelated income."103
Because the ACM transaction served to shelter unrelated income, it
constituted a tax shelter rather than merely aggressive tax planning.
Unless it is possible to distinguish between a tax shelter and a
legitimate business transaction, Hariton suggests that the economic

the basis of the AAA notes (while preserving the $12 million basis step-up in
Countryside's real property), triggering $12 million of deferred capital gain to the
redeemed partners when the AAA notes were ultimately paid. The redeemed
partners were also liable for a twenty percent penalty on a portion of the tax
underpayment. Although the stipulated decision addresses the basis duplication
portion of the transaction, it leaves intact the gain deferral and conversion sanctioned
in the original Countryside decision.
9
Hariton, supra note 7, at 7 (defining "unintended tax benefits").
100 Id. (defining "tax benefits"); see also Hariton, supra note
6, at 30 (proposing
that the economic substance doctrine be applied only to tax shelters, "define[d] as
transactions that, when considered as a whole, serve primarily to generate net losses,
deductions[,] or credits that can be used to eliminate the tax that otherwise would be
imposed on unrelated income").
101Hariton, Kafka, supra note 4, at 33.
102 ACM P'ship v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231 (3d
Cir. 1998); United Parcel
Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Commissioner, 254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001).
103 Hariton, Kafka, supra note 4, at 22.
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substance doctrine may prove self-defeating because, under an
expansive application, the government will be unable to single out
marketed shelters for appropriately harsh penalties.
According to Hariton, UPS was not a tax shelter case because the
transaction, considered as a whole, did not give rise to any tax
benefits, and was merely a way of structuring UPS's parcel insurance
business to "insulate itself from the imposition of U.S. tax on these
profits by transferring them to an offshore affiliate."". Rather than
offsetting unrelated income, the transaction eliminated tax on income
derived from UPS's highly-profitable parcel insurance business. Prior
to the restructuring, UPS collected an "excess value charge" (EVC)
from customers to insure packages above a low fixed limit on UPS's
liability. Following the restructuring, UPS continued to deal with its
customers in handling receipts and claims, but remitted the net EVC
to an unrelated insurance company (NUF), which remitted the EVC
as a reinsurance premium to a Bermuda corporation (OPL) whose
stock was owned almost entirely by UPS's shareholders. To reallocate
income to UPS and away from the related foreign corporation, the
government invoked the economic substance doctrine as well as
section 482.
In UPS, the court stated that "a transaction has a 'business
purpose' . . . as long as it figures in a bona fide profit-seeking
business., 106 Since the EVC arrangement itself served a business
purpose - "there was a real business that served the genuine need for
customers to enjoy loss coverage" - the majority found that the
restructuring served a valid business purpose.o Focusing only on the
parties' formal arrangements, the majority concluded that the
transaction created genuine third-party obligations and thus had "real
economic effects."'08 The majority framed the transaction broadly for
the business purpose test, but narrowly for the economic effect test.
By contrast, the dissent found that the tax-motivated steps -

See id. at 32 (responding to criticism that penalties are appropriate because
"there is no right to engage in aggressive tax planning"); cf Weisbach, supra note 70,
at 224 (arguing that policy makers should not be concerned about inhibiting tax
planning because "all tax planning, all altering of behavior in response to taxes,
should be suspect").
105 Hariton, supra note 6, at
44.
106
United ParcelServ., 254 F.3d at 1019.
0
Id. at 1020 ("The transaction under challenge here simply altered the form of
an existing, bona fide business, and this case therefore falls in with those that find an
adequate business purpose to neutralize any tax-avoidance motive.").
" Id.
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insertion of the unrelated insurance company and creation of the
UPS-affiliated offshore company - lacked a valid business purpose.
It also determined that any nontax economic effects were essentially
meaningless: in return for a large fee, the third-party insurer assumed
only an infinitesimal exposure to loss and passed on the net EVC
income to the UPS-affiliated offshore entity.o10
Under section 7701(o), the UPS transaction might well run afoul
of the economic substance test. In UPS, the court indicated that a
valid business purpose for a transaction need not be "free of tax
considerations," emphasizing that "tax planning is permissible.""'
Under the majority's expansive view of a business purpose as
potentially including a purpose to reduce taxes, it would be virtually
impossible for most corporate transactions to fail to satisfy this prong
of the economic substance test. By contrast, section 7701(o) requires a
substantial nontax purpose, apart from tax savings.112 Even assuming
UPS's stated business purpose were sufficient, it is not clear that the
offshore captive insurance arrangement represented a reasonable
means of accomplishing UPS's nontax goal. Moreover, any nontax
economic effects might well be viewed as insignificant in relationship
to the tax benefits, since the transaction had virtually no effect on
UPS's overall economic position.
Hariton praises the decision because UPS was conducting a real
business and the government should not be permitted to "ferret out"
tax-motivated steps or structures that, "considered on their own,
Basically,
lacked business purpose and economic substance.""
Hariton's claim is that the UPS transaction was not a tax shelter and
thus should not be subject to attack under the economic substance
doctrine, even though it might fail on other grounds.114 Unlike the
ACM transaction which generated "a capital loss that dwarfed the
business objectives of the taxpayer and any profits arising from them,"
the UPS restructuring did not give rise to any tax benefits "that could

Id. at 1021-22 (Ryskamp, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1021 ("In essence, [the third-party insurer] received an enormous fee
from UPS in exchange for nothing.").
10

110

I

Id. at 1019.

See I.R.C. § 7701 (o)(1)(B).
Hariton, supra note 5, at 541; id. (maintaining that broader application would
be "tantamount to applying a general antiabuse rule to tax-related structuring").
114 See Hariton, Kafka, supra note 4, at 11 ("In
UPS, moreover, the tax benefit
from the business restructuring did not exceed the tax that otherwise would have been
imposed on the profits arising from the business itself.").
112

113
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be used to offset the tax on unrelated income.".. Even if one accepts
the distinction Hariton draws between ACM and UPS, Congress
rejected proposed legislation that narrowly focused on tax-shelter
transactions. For purposes of applying section 7701(o), the focus
should not be on whether the UPS restructuring gave rise to an
unintended tax benefit (under Hariton's restrictive definition) by
reducing unrelated income.'16 Framed narrowly, the UPS transaction
obviously yielded a substantial tax benefit - by deflecting income to
an offshore affiliate, it eliminated tax on income that would otherwise
have arisen in UPS's parcel insurance business.'17 The relevant
question should thus be whether the tax benefit arising from the
transaction was reasonably intended by Congress.
Following enactment of section 7701(o), the economic substance
doctrine should not necessarily invalidate the UPS transaction. Even
if the formation of the offshore affiliate was entirely tax-motivated, an
important line of cases would arguably respect an entity's separate
status as long as it conducts some business. Under Moline
Properties,""the fact that a corporation is formed merely to obtain a
tax advantage is not necessarily fatal. For purposes of scrutiny under
section 7701(o), UPS might well be able to argue successfully that the
creation of the offshore affiliate was immunized by the exception for
certain basic business transactions, including "a transaction or series
of transactions that constitute a corporate organization or
reorganization under subchapter C."" 9 In this light, the UPS
transaction could be viewed as "simply taking advantage of the
combination of several long-standing, well-understood, and generally
accepted tax principles" upholding use of the corporate form to
structure a business in a tax-efficient manner.120
One should be careful, however, not to extrapolate from UPS
lessons applicable outside the corporate area. In Culbertson, the
Supreme Court held that a valid partnership exists only if "the parties

16

Id. at 11-12.

"1 Cf id. at 17 ("But the answer depends on the definition of tax benefits.").
117 But see id. at 18 ("But if we do define the
transaction more narrowly, then
how do we define the transaction when the taxpayer's business is not restructured but
rather is aggressively structured to begin with?") (emphasis in original).
11
Moline Props. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
119 Technical Explanation, supra note 1, at 152
(listing transactions exempt from
the economic substance doctrine).
120 Martin J. McMahon, Living With
the Codified Economic Substance Doctrine,
128 TAX NOTES 731, 738 (Aug. 16, 2010); id. (noting that the tax benefits in UPS
"should be considered to have been ratified by decades of congressional inaction").
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in good faith and acting with a business purpose intended to join
together in the present conduct of the enterprise., 12' Even if a
partnership has sufficient business purpose and objective economic
substance to avoid being treated as a sham, the Second Circuit's
decision in Castle Harbour suggests that Culbertson may require
closer scrutiny to determine whether the form of the transaction
accurately reflects its substance.122 The Castle Harbour transaction
involved two tax-exempt Dutch banks and two subsidiaries of General
Electric Capital Corp. (the GECC entities), which owned fully
depreciated airplanes that were net-leased to an unrelated user.
Nearly all (ninety-eight percent) of the partnership's book and tax
income was allocated to the banks, but most of their share of book
income was offset by book depreciation, leaving the banks with a
much smaller share of economic income. The net result was to
redirect most of the economic income to the GECC entities free of
tax, allowing them essentially to "redepreciate" the zero-basis planes
and reduce their tax liability by $62 million.12
The district court found that the transaction had real nontax
effects and a valid business purpose: it actually raised $117 million of
capital and was subjectively motivated, in part, by GECC's desire to
demonstrate its ability to monetize the leased aircraft.124 The court
Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949); see also ASA Investerings
P'ship v. Commissioner, 201 F.3d 505 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (disregarding sham
partnership).
122 TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States (Castle HarbourII), 459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir.
2006), rev'g TIFD Il-E, Inc. v. United States (Castle Harbour1), 342 F. Supp. 2d 94
(D. Conn. 2004). On remand to consider issues under section 704(e), the district court
once again held that the banks were partners of a valid partnership for income tax
purposes, prompting a renewed appeal to the Second Circuit. TIFD II-E, Inc. v.
United States (Castle HarbourIII), 660 F. Supp. 2d 367 (D. Conn. 2009); see generally
Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Snookered Again: Castle Harbour
Revisited, 128 TAx NOTES 1143 (Sept. 13, 2010); Monte A. Jackel & Robert J.
Crnkovich, Castle Harbour Strikes Again, 125 TAx NOTES 591 (Nov. 2,2009).
123 In return for facilitating the transaction, the Dutch banks received essentially
a guaranteed return of their investment plus a specified rate of return. See Chirelstein
& Zelenak, supra note 9, at 1966 ("The banks were creditors in all but name, and the
annual distribution of book income was nothing more than a 'fast-pay' repayment of
debt plus interest.").
124 Noting that "[i]n a transaction where a part of an ongoing business is spun off
into a separate partnership, the fact that the underlying business has economic
substance does not necessarily preclude a finding that the creation of the spin-off was
a sham transaction," the district court nevertheless found that the formation of the
Castle Harbour partnership was valid. Castle Harbour1, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 113; id. at
113 n.38 (distinguishing United Parcel Service where the "court found the underlying
121
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also upheld the validity of the partnership, finding that Culbertson was
satisfied because the partnership had economic substance and was not
a sham.125 On appeal, the Second Circuit found that the district court
erred by confining its Culbertson analysis to the narrow issue of
whether the partnership was a sham and "by accepting at face value
the appearances and labels created by the partnership, rather than
assessing the underlying economic realities."1 2 6 Given the
overwhelmingly debt-like nature of their interests, the Dutch banks
lacked a "bona fide equity participation" and failed to qualify as
127
partners for income tax purposes.
While the Dutch banks
purportedly enjoyed a limited upside potential, the Second Circuit
found that the arrangement, viewed as a whole, was "more in the
nature of window dressing designed to give ostensible support to the
characterization of equity participation, which was essential to the
dominant tax objective, than a meaningful stake in the profits of the

venture.", 28
In comparison to UPS, Castle Harbour suggests that Culbertson
imposes a heightened business purpose requirement when a portion of
a business is spun off to a partnership. Requiring a weightier nontax
business purpose may well be justified, given the heightened taxavoidance opportunities arising from use of the partnership form.
Castle Harbour also serves as a reminder that the economic substance
doctrine and other common law doctrines such as substance over form
business purpose of a reorganized entity to be sufficient to justify the reorganization
transaction").
125 See id. at 112-13 (equating economic
substance, business purpose, and sham
doctrines, and finding Culbertson was satisfied because "the transaction that created
Castle Harbourwas not a sham"); see id. at 116 n.40. The district court concluded that
there was a "legitimate non-tax reason to create a separate entity" and that the
partnership arrangement was "one - even if not the only - legitimate way of
achieving [GECC's] non-tax purpose." Id. at 114.
126 Castle HarbourII, 459 F.3d at 231.
127 Id. at 241. As the Second Circuit explained, the "[t]he [service's] challenge to
the taxpayer's characterization [of the Dutch banks' partnership interest] is not
foreclosed merely because the taxpayer can point to the existence of some business
purpose or objective reality in addition to its tax-avoidance objective." Id. at 232.
128 Id. at 236. Because the Second Circuit found that the Dutch banks' interest
was overwhelmingly debt-like, it was unnecessary to address the economic substance
issue on appeal. See id. at 231 n.11. If the Second Circuit affirms the district court's
section 704(e)(1) holding that the banks nevertheless qualified as partners - based
on their ownership of a capital interest under section 704(e)(1), without regard to
Culbertson - it will need to determine the validity of the partnership's allocations
under section 704(b). See TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States (Castle Harbour III), 660
F. Supp. 2d 367, 383-95 (D. Conn. 2009).
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are often overlapping, making it difficult to sort out when a particular
doctrine should apply. 129Although section 7701(o) is not intended to
limit a taxpayer's choice to capitalize a business with debt or equity,"'
this exception should not serve to immunize a Castle Harbour-type
transaction in which a debt-like instrument is cast as equity to exploit
the tax-indifferent status of a putative partner. In comparison to the
anticipated tax savings, GECC's purported business purpose was quite
weak.13 If section 7701(o) applied to such a transaction, a court should
reject the notion that the tax benefits were clearly contemplated:
structuring a transaction in a manner intended to shift tax (but not
economic) income to a tax-exempt party upon a contribution of highvalue, low-basis property is inconsistent with the purpose of

Subchapter K. 13 2
V. CONCLUSION
In considering framing explicitly, Hariton focuses on what is
arguably the most difficult issue that courts are likely to face in
applying the economic substances doctrine - namely, whether to
disallow tax benefits by disaggregating tax-motivated steps (which,
standing alone, clearly lack economic substance) from a purported
larger transaction. While Hariton understandably seeks to establish an
outer boundary for Coltec's disaggregation approach, his proposed
presumption against bifurcation would deprive the economic
substance doctrine of much of its essential flexibility. In enacting
section 7701, Congress expressly approved of the disaggregation
approach and gave courts broad discretion in framing the relevant
transaction. Although such flexibility inevitably gives rise to
See Technical Explanation, supra note 1, at 142 n.300 (noting that
certain
substance-over-form cases involving tax-indifferent parties "have also involved
examination whether the change in economic position that occurred, if any, was
consistent with the form asserted, and whether the claimed business purpose
supported the particular tax benefits that were claimed"); Altria Grp. v.
Commissioner, 694 F. Supp. 2d 259, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("Castle Harbour,however,
teaches that the Government enjoys the benefit of the resulting legal uncertainty, and
is not limited to the test most favorable to the taxpayer's position.....
130 See Technical Explanation,supra note
1, at 152.
131 Not only did GECC not need to raise
an additional $117 million of cash for
use in its aircraft leasing business, but there was no evidence that the Dutch banks'
cash was actually used for that purpose.
132 Under current law, such a transaction is covered by a specific anti-abuse rule.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(10) (2010); see also Treas. Reg. §§ 1.704-3(b)(2), ex. 2,
(c)(4), ex. 3 (2010).
129
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uncertainty, the central question under the codified version of
economic substance (as under prior law) is whether the overall result
of a multi-step transaction is consistent with Congressional intent. If
the tax benefits are clearly contemplated - as arguably was the case
in UPS - the taxpayer should win.' By contrast, transactions that
seek to exploit unintended technical gaps deserve to fail. Perhaps
ironically, codification may encourage taxpayers to argue that such
transactions do not work technically, in the hope of avoiding strict
liability penalties under section 7701.

See Bankman, supra note 8, at 13 (economic substance doctrine cannot apply
where "a sensible reading of text, legislative intent, and purpose suggest it should not
apply").
133

